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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mutual fund firms, also known as investment companies or 
investment trusts, buy and sell stocks, bonds, and other securities.2  A 
fund raises money to make its purchases by selling shares in itself.  The 
fund pools the money of many investors—its shareholders—to invest in 
the securities.3  Those securities are professionally managed by fund 
managers on behalf of the shareholders.  After the trading costs and 
expenses of managing and administering the fund are subtracted, the 
earnings realized by the fund on its investment portfolio are paid out 
 1. Technically, a mutual fund is an open-end management company registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2005) [hereinafter the 
Investment Company Act].  An “open-end company” is a management company that 
issues a redeemable security.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (2005). 
 2. Mutual fund firms are also known as mutual fund complexes and mutual fund 
companies.  For the purposes of consistency in this paper, we refer to them as mutual 
fund firms or funds, and to the persons who manage the funds as mutual fund managers 
or fund managers. 
 3. The term redeemable security is defined in Section 2(a)(32) of the Investment 
Company Act to mean a security the terms of which entitles the holder, upon 
presentation “to receive approximately his proportionate share of the issuer’s current net 
assets, or the cash equivalent thereof.”  15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32) (2005). 
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pro-rata to the fund’s shareholders.  Shareholders may also realize 
investment gains by selling (or redeeming) their shares back to the fund 
at the shares’ net asset value (the total value of the fund’s assets divided 
by the number of shares outstanding). 
Mutual funds have recently become increasingly popular vehicles 
for individual investors in the United States.  In 1980 there were 564 
funds with assets totaling $134.8 billion.4  As of the end of December 
2005 there were 7,977 funds with combined assets of $8.905 trillion.5  
Similarly, in 1980, 4.6 million households owned mutual fund shares, 
representing only 5.7% of all households in the United States.6  As of 
2005, 91 million individuals in 54 million households (nearly half of all 
households) owned mutual funds.7  It should be noted that the majority 
of household investments in mutual funds occur through employee 
retirement plans.8  A healthy percentage, however, is purchased by the 
investors themselves, and of those purchases, more than 80% are made 
through financial professionals.9
Individual investors can purchase mutual fund shares on the retail 
market in one of two ways, either directly from the fund, or through an 
intermediary seller.  In the first case, investors purchase “direct-
marketed funds” via phone, mail, or the internet.  In the second instance, 
the fund’s underwriter acts as a wholesaler or distributor to an 
intermediary firm, (e.g. a brokerage firm, an asset management 
company, a financial planning firm, an insurance agency, or a bank) 
which in turn sells to the individual investor via a sales force.10  Some 
brokerage firms also sell their own private-label funds. 
The typical retail shopper who purchases shares through a financial 
adviser will be given a fund prospectus.  The prospectus includes 
information regarding the investment objective of the fund, the historical 
 4. Investment Company Institute, 2006 Investment Company Fact Book 71 (46th 
ed. 2006), available at http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/2006_factbook.pdf. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 47. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. at 50. 
 9. Id. 
 10. For the purpose of consistency in this paper, we refer to these salespersons as 
investment advisers.  The term advisor is also proper and is used by several professional 
organizations.  In specific instances we use the terms brokerage firms and brokers.  
Brokers and other financial advisers will have the NASD Series 6 license, which allows 
them to sell mutual fund products.  Many will also have the NASD Series 7 license, 
which allows them to sell securities. 
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investment performance of the fund, and the costs and expenses the 
shareholder will pay.  The compensation received by the financial 
adviser for recommending or selling the shares is included in the fee 
table in the prospectus; however, in most cases it is not identified 
explicitly.  Adviser compensation information is required to be 
presented explicitly in the Statement of Additional Information (SAI).  
The SAI must also include a description of potential conflicts of interest 
which the adviser’s method of compensation might create.  Notable, 
however, is the fact that the SAI is provided to the potential shareholders 
only if they specifically request it. 
Brokerage firms and the various financial advisers who sell mutual 
funds to retail purchasers may be compensated in a variety of ways, 
including (1) loads, or sales charges paid directly by the purchaser; (2) 
marketing fees, also known as 12b-111 fees; and (3) fund servicing and 
operating expenses.12  Both 12b-1 and fund expense fees are paid out of 
the assets of the fund, and thus are ultimately paid by the shareholders.  
Payments from each of these sources compensate financial advising 
firms and their personnel for providing a wide range of services, 
including the administering of shareholder records, processing 
transactions, training the advisers who sell the funds, and investor 
education.  While fund firms assert that these services provide advisers 
and investors with valuable benefits, others, including regulators, 
criticize the lack of transparency in brokerage firm compensation, since 
it is practically impossible for investors to know precisely if, and how, 
financial advisers are paid out of fund assets. 
Financial adviser compensation is often augmented by enhanced 
compensation arrangements, such as directed brokerage, soft dollar 
commissions, revenue sharing, and differential cash compensation, each 
of which has been the source of criticism in recent years, due to potential 
conflicts of interest inherent in the practices, and the lack of disclosure 
of the practices to investors.  This paper examines the practices and 
recommends changes to reduce, if not eliminate, the potential harm to 
investors inherent in their use. 
 11. Rule 12b was promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-lll (2005)) [hereinafter the Securities 
Exchange Act].  See discussion infra Part III.B for a detailed discussion of 12b-1 fees. 
 12. See generally Susan S. Krawczyk, Compensation Practices for Retail Sales of 
Mutual Funds, 4 J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 27 (2004) (discussing compensation 
practices in detail). 
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II. ENHANCED COMPENSATION PRACTICES 
A. Directed Brokerage 
In directed brokerage arrangements, mutual funds channel trades to 
brokers who promise to promote those funds in exchange for 
commissions on the mutual fund’s stock and bond transactions.  Put 
another way, in directed brokerage, a mutual fund typically promises to 
buy a certain amount of brokerage services from a broker-dealer who in 
turn agrees to promote that mutual fund to investors.  Critics level two 
charges against directed brokerage: (1) the practice can lead a broker to 
recommend mutual funds that are not in his client’s best interest; and (2) 
it can lead a fund firm to select a broker based on increasing its sales, 
rather than on getting the best execution of its trades.  That can lead to 
high trading costs being passed to fund shareholders. 
As is discussed in Parts III.B and III.D.3 of this paper, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the “NASD”) banned the 
practice of directed brokerage in 2004, because of its potential for 
creating conflicts of interest by generating incentives for fund managers 
to direct fund transactions to firms who were encouraging sales of their 
funds, rather than to the firms that could provide the best execution or 
price on fund transactions. 
B. Soft Dollar Practices 
The SEC is currently examining the practice of soft dollar 
commissions.  Soft dollars refer to an arrangement whereby fund 
managers direct fund trades through a particular brokerage firm in 
exchange for brokerage services, including investment research.  Fund 
managers typically use soft dollar payments to pay for investment 
research because, by doing so, they are able to hide the costs of research 
in brokerage commissions, when those costs would ordinarily be paid 
out of fund assets.  Transaction costs, including soft dollar commissions, 
are not included in a fund’s expense ratio, because accounting principles 
dictate that they be included as part of the cost basis of securities 
purchased or subtracted from the net proceeds of securities sold. 
For example, suppose Fund A pays for research by adding to its 
management fee, which is disclosed in the prospectus fee table.  Fund B 
pays for the same research with soft dollars, commissions paid to the 
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brokerage firm providing the research.  Those costs do not appear in the 
fee table.  Instead, those costs are part of the fund’s transactions costs, 
which are typically disclosed in the Statement of Additional Information 
(“SAI”).  Thus, to most investors, Fund B appears to have a lower 
expense ratio than Fund A.  In reality, the costs charged by the fund and 
paid by the investor are the same. 
Supporters of the practice maintain that soft dollar payments benefit 
shareholders by giving small fund advisers access to valuable research, 
thereby enhancing the competitiveness and price efficiency of small 
mutual funds.  Opponents criticize the lack of transparency and 
oversight in soft dollar arrangements.  They also argue that soft dollar 
compensation can create conflicts of interest for fund managers, because 
the fund managers may be motivated to select brokers based on their 
research services rather than on the speed or price of trade execution for 
fund transactions. 
There currently exists a safe harbor rule that allows fund managers 
to use client funds to purchase “brokerage and research services” for 
their managed accounts under certain circumstances without breaching 
their fiduciary duties to clients.13  Under Section 28(e) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 as amended, mutual fund firms may pay higher 
than normally allowed commissions if the fund firm deems the higher 
commission is in the best interest of the fund.14  If it participates in soft 
dollar practices outside the safe harbor, however, it may be subject to 
liability for breach of fiduciary duty to clients. 
Critics of soft dollar practices have advocated repealing Section 
28(e), or outlawing soft-dollar transactions altogether.  Others have 
called for greater oversight and stricter definitions of what can and 
cannot be bought with soft dollars.  As discussed in Part III.D.4 of this 
paper, the SEC has recently issued a release containing interpretative 
guidance as to which soft dollar practices are within the scope of the 
safe harbor established by Section 28(e). 
C. Revenue Sharing and Shelf-Space Practices 
Most, if not all, mutual funds make payments to brokerage firms 
that sell the funds’ shares.  As the SEC defines it, revenue sharing 
 
 13. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–29, 89 Stat. 97 
(1975). 
 14. See id. 
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occurs when a fund manager agrees to pay a brokerage firm cash 
compensation not otherwise disclosed in the prospectus fee table to 
promote the mutual fund to the broker’s clients.  This type of payment 
creates a clear conflict of interest by introducing a new factor for an 
investment adviser to consider—his or her company’s own financial 
profit—when deciding which mutual funds to recommend to an investor.  
These payments are often referred to as buying “shelf space” at the 
broker-dealer firm.  In some cases, the fund manager may describe those 
payments as reimbursing the brokerage firm for expenses it incurs in 
selling the shares.  The payments, regardless of whether they are labeled 
reimbursements or otherwise, may give the brokerage firm a greater 
incentive to sell the shares of that fund or an affiliate, rather than the 
shares of funds that don’t make such payments. 
The SEC is reviewing the disclosure of these so-called revenue-
sharing deals.  Regulators are looking particularly closely at revenue 
sharing and shelf space arrangements because of the financial incentives 
they may create for brokers to recommend one fund over another.15  
While brokers argue that spotlighting a particular fund is no guarantee of 
sales, others say that compensating brokers for promoting a fund may 
not be in the best interest of the firms’ clients.16
D. Differential Cash Compensation 
Differential cash compensation is the practice of paying sales 
representatives higher cash compensation for sales of proprietary and 
“partnered funds.”  Proprietary funds are those offered by the sales 
representative’s employer (e.g. brokerage firm or insurance company).  
Partnered funds are those offered by firms that have an agreement with 
the sales representative’s employer to promote those funds in exchange 
for cash payments.  According to Financial Research Corporation 
estimates, in 2003 the fifty largest fund companies in the United States 
paid securities firms roughly $1.5 billion annually to distribute their 
funds.17
 
 15. See generally CONFIRMATION REQUIREMENTS AND POINT OF SALE DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANSACTIONS IN CERTAIN MUTUAL FUNDS AND OTHER 
SECURITIES, AND OTHER CONFIRMATION REQUIREMENT AMENDMENTS, AND 
AMENDMENTS TO THE REGISTRATION FORM FOR MUTUAL FUNDS, 69 Fed. Reg. 6438-01, 
6451 (Feb. 10, 2004). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Deloitte Development, 2005 Global Securities Industry Outlook: 2005 Top 10 
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Differential cash compensation is currently not prohibited under 
applicable rules and regulations, but critics charge that, like other types 
of enhanced compensation arrangements, they create a potential conflict 
of interest when a securities firm recommends mutual funds and the 
commission relationship is not adequately disclosed to investors.  Even 
if there is adequate disclosure, the potential conflict of interest remains, 
and investors must be aware of that. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF COMPENSATION PRACTICES 
Compensation practices for mutual funds have evolved over time.  
Prior to 1980, compensation to the sellers of fund shares was primarily 
accomplished through front-end load charges.  By the late 1990s, 
compensation arrangements generally entailed several methods, and the 
investor usually had a choice in the methods applied.  The key change 
was the approval of 12b-1 plans, which allow for the payment of 
marketing and distribution expenses from fund assets.  These plans 
allow for both different share classes within a particular fund, and the 
practice of revenue sharing. 
A. A Brief History of Mutual Funds and National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc. 
The first pooled funds were introduced in the United States in the 
1890s.18  In 1924, the Massachusetts Investors Trust became the first 
open-end mutual fund.19  Shortly thereafter, in response to the 1929 
stock market crash, Congress passed the Securities Act of 193320 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.21  The 1933 and 1934 acts require, 
among other things, that investment funds be registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and that prospective fund 
investors be provided with a prospectus.  In 1934, Congress also passed 
 
Issues, at 5, available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/dtt_financial 
services_topten2005-securities_013105(3).pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 18. K. Geert Rouwenhorst, The Origins of Mutual Funds 17 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt., 
Int’l Center for Fin., Working Paper No. 04-48, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=636146 (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 19. Id. 
 20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2005). 
 21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-lll (2005). 
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the National Industrial Recovery Act (the “NIRA”).22  The act called for 
industrial self-regulation and declared that codes of fair competition—
for the protection of consumers, competitors, and employers—were to 
be drafted for the various industries of the country.23  In 1935, the U.S. 
Supreme Court invalidated the compulsory-code system, ruling that the 
NIRA improperly delegated legislative powers to the executive and that 
the provisions of the poultry code at issue in the case did not constitute a 
regulation of interstate commerce.24
The the NASD grew out of the Investment Bankers Code 
Committee (the “IBCC”) formed by the investment banking business 
under the NIRA.25  When the NIRA was declared unconstitutional, the 
IBCC was continued on a voluntary basis, becoming the Investment 
Bankers Conference Committee, its function to be one of discussion and 
conference with federal agencies looking toward the establishment of an 
organization to preserve and formalize the values of the code.26  A 
successor organization known as the Investment Bankers Conference, 
Inc. (the “IBC”) was established to proceed more formally towards the 
objective of a legal entity empowered to administer rules promoting 
“high standards of commercial honor.”27  An important objective of the 
IBC was the development of a plan of self-regulation for over-the-
counter markets.28  By November of 1937, the SEC and an IBC 
governing committee prepared the draft of legislation to accomplish the 
self-regulatory objective.29  The bill, known as the Maloney Act, was 
signed into law in 1938.30  The NASD, the successor to the IBC, was 
registered by the SEC as a national securities association under section 
15A of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.31
The NASD is currently the world’s leading private-sector provider 
of financial regulatory services.  Under U.S. law, every securities firm 
 22. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935). 
 25. Fulton, Wallace H., The Origin of the NASD, 1933-1939: The OTC Market’s 
Venture Into Self-Regulation, at  http://www.people.hbs.edu/aperold/resource/ISR/ 
Teaching%20Note/AKS%20-%20History%20of%20the%20NASD.doc (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2007). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Fulton, supra note 25, at 1. 
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doing business with the American public must register with NASD.32  
The NASD registers securities firms, writes rules to govern their 
behavior, examines them for compliance and, when necessary, brings 
enforcement actions against those who break those rules.  
Approximately 5,100 brokerage firms and more than 660,000 
stockbrokers and registered representatives currently fall under the 
jurisdiction of the NASD.33
B. The Evolution of Rule 12b-1 
In 1940, Congress enacted the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(the “1940 Act”),34 which is the principal statute under which the mutual 
fund industry is regulated today.  The 1940 Act seeks to prevent abuses 
through mandating disclosure regarding an investment company’s 
structure, operations, financial condition and policies when shares of the 
investment company are initially offered to the public and, thereafter, on 
a regular periodic basis.35  Investment companies typically register their 
securities with the SEC under the 1933 Act and their companies under 
the 1940 Act.36  Investment advisers use Form ADV to register as an 
investment adviser with the SEC. 
The provisions in the 1940 Act govern, among other things, 
transactions between the investment company and its affiliates (e.g., 
investment advisers to the investment company), purchases and sales of 
investment company shares and the responsibilities of the investment 
company’s directors or trustees.37
 
 32. NASD Rules and Regulations, available at http://www.nasd.com/Rules 
Regulation/index.htm?ssSourceNodeId=9 (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). 
 33. About NASD, available at http://www.nasd.com/AboutNASD/index.htm (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2007). 
 34. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2005). 
 35. NASD website, available at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_ 
GET_PAGE&nodeId=608 
 36. Investment advisers use Form ADV to register with the SEC. Generally, an 
investment adviser that manages $25 million or more in client assets must register with 
the SEC. Advisers that manage less than $25 million must register with the state 
securities regulator where the adviser’s principal place of business is located. Form 
ADV also is used for state registration.  Form ADV has two parts. Part I contains 
information about the adviser’s education, business and an adviser’s disciplinary history 
within the last ten years. Part II includes information on an adviser’s services, fees and 
investment strategies. 
 37. See NASD website, supra note 35. 
694 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF  Vol. XII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
The 1940 Act bans the use of fund assets to pay for the distribution 
of a fund’s shares.38 However, in the late 1970s, mutual funds 
experienced a significant and steady outflow of cash from redemptions 
of shares.39 This left the remaining shareholders to pay the fixed costs of 
the funds as the costs were spread over fewer shareholders. 
The fund industry lobbied for the use of fund assets to pay for 
distribution costs and persuaded the SEC to pass Rule 12b-140 in 
October 1980. The rule permits funds to pay the costs of marketing and 
distribution of fund shares as long as they are properly disclosed and 
regulated. The annual fee is included in the fund’s reported expense 
ratio. Since 1980, the total of these fees has grown from a few million to 
over $10 billion in 2004.41 This is due in part to the rapid growth of 
mutual fund assets, but is also due to the significant drop in front-end 
loads, both in terms of size (the typical load has dropped from 8% in 
1980 to 5% today) and in terms of the percentage of funds which charge 
a front-end load.42
Although it was initially meant as a short-term solution to the high 
level of net redemptions in the 1970s, Rule 12b-1 is largely responsible 
for the class system of funds used today. A fund will often have various 
classes of shares that differ in their commission structures.43 For 
example, one class might have a high initial sales commission and a 
small (usually .25%) annual fee paid for by a 12b-1 plan, while another 
class might have a small initial sales commission and a large (perhaps 
1.0%) annual 12b-1 fee. The expense ratio of a fund typically includes 
three components: an advisory fee, administrative fee (such as legal and 
accounting costs) and 12b-1 fees. For multiple class shares, the advisory 
fee is always the same across classes. Administrative fees and 12b-1 fees 
can vary across classes although the administrative fee is often the same. 
The selection of share class by an investor typically depends on the 
 38. Id. 
 39. Lori Walsh, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Costs and Benefits 
to Fund Shareholders of 12b-1 Plans: An Examination of Fund Flows, Expenses and 
Return, at 6, available at http://ftp.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70904/lwalsh042604.pdf. 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2007). 
 40. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2005). 
 41. INV. CO. INST., How Mutual Funds Use 12b-1 Fees, Fundamentals: Investment 
Company Institute Research in Brief, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.ici.org/statements/fundamentals/fm-v14n2.pdf. 
 42. Supra note 4, at 4. 
 43. Supra note 39, at 5. 
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expected holding period. An investor with a short expected holding 
period might find it beneficial to buy shares with no up-front fee but 
high annual fees. A long-term investor does better with shares that have 
a large initial fee but small annual fees. 
There are two important differences between load fees and 12b-1 
fees besides the obvious one-time fee versus annual fee. First, they differ 
in the level of transparency. The load charge is clearly stated in the 
confirmation statement that the investor receives from the fund or the 
broker who sold the shares. On the other hand, the investor is never 
explicitly told the amount of the 12b-1 fees—it is neatly buried in the 
expense ratio. Second, loads are a fixed amount charged at the account 
level, and each investor pays only for his or her costs. 12b-1 fees are 
charged at the fund level, and investors may pay for other investors’ 
costs. The aggregate amount that investors pay increases as their holding 
period increases and as the asset level rises. Because the fees are 
deducted at the fund level, some investors subsidize the costs of other 
investors. For example, small accounts typically cost more, as a percent 
of the account size, than large accounts; and yet both investors pay the 
same percent. 
There is also a crucial difference between brokerage commissions 
and both load fees and 12b-1 fees in terms of transparency. 
Commissions are not even disclosed in the expense ratio. When the fund 
purchases a security the commission is added to the cost basis of the 
asset, and when a security is sold the commission is deducted from the 
proceeds of the sale. Assuming a security is bought and sold for a gain, 
the profit for shareholders is the net profit after deducting the 
commissions on both the purchase and the sale. The total of all 
commissions is disclosed as a lump sum (usually labeled as transactions 
costs) in the SAI which is typically delivered to a shareholder only if 
requested. Thus, directed brokerage payments and soft dollar 
commissions are quite unlikely to be uncovered by the vast majority of 
shareholders. 
A recent survey by the Investment Company Institute (the “ICI”) 
showed that funds use most of the 12b-1 fees to compensate financial 
advisers for assisting fund investors before and after they purchase fund 
shares.44 Only a small fraction of the fees are used for advertising and 
promotion.45 Thus, the primary use of revenues raised through 12b-1 
 44. Supra note 41, at 1. 
 45. Id. 
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fees is to create incentives for advisers to distribute the fund shares, 
making advisers the main beneficiaries of 12b-1 plans. 
On August 14, 2004, the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 12b 
prohibiting the use of fund brokerage to compensate broker-dealers for 
selling fund shares.46 New Rule 12b-1(h)(2) permits a fund to use 
brokers selling its shares to execute transactions in its portfolio securities 
only if the fund or its adviser has implemented policies and procedures 
designed to ensure that the selection of selling brokers for portfolio 
securities transactions is not influenced by considerations about the sale 
of fund shares.47 The rule and correlating NASD Rule 2830(k) are 
discussed in further detail in Part III.D.3 of this paper. 
C. Congressional Initiatives 
The poor performance of mutual funds in the early 2000s, partially 
as a result of the collapse of the technology bubble and the slowdown in 
the world economy, led to intense scrutiny of the mutual fund industry 
by many, including Congress.48 Criticism focused, in part, on the 
transparency of fund fees and costs, and specifically the practices of 
directed brokerage, revenue sharing and soft dollars.49
In early 2003, the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, 
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises held hearings on 
mutual fund practices, including mutual fund fee and cost disclosure 
issues, sales practices and governance. On June 11, 2003, Representative 
Richard H. Baker and twenty-three co-sponsors introduced H.R. 2420 
(the “Mutual Fund Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of 2003”).50 
Among other things, H.R. 2420 required the SEC to require disclosure 
of a number of items and required the adviser to submit an annual report 
to the fund directors on revenue sharing, directed brokerage and soft 
 
 46. SEC Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance 
Distribution, 17 C.F.R. § 270 (2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ic-
26591.htm. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Thomas R. Smith, Jr., Sidley Austin Brown and Wood, Mutual Funds 
Under Fire: Developments Since January 1, 2003 (Jul. 1, 2005), at 1, available at 
http://www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/TRS%20Chronology%20-
%20VERSION%2012%20070105.pdf. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Thomas R. Smith, Jr., Mutual Funds Under Fire: Reform Initiatives, 7 J. OF 
INV. COMPLIANCE 4 (2006). 
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dollars.51 It imposed a fiduciary duty on the fund directors to supervise 
the arrangements.52 H.R. 2420 also required brokers to disclose 
information about differential compensation and conflicts of interest 
associated with the broker’s sale of a particular fund, along with 
information about commissions that may be charged based on the class 
of shares the investor has purchased.53
By mid-summer, however, efforts to pass H.R. 2420 had stalled.54 
The bill died for a lack of support in the House and the inability to even 
find a sponsor in the Senate. Instead, the House Subcommittee directed 
its efforts to having the SEC deal with the matters addressed by H.R. 
2420 through rulemaking.55
Following market timing, late trading scandals, and subsequent 
prosecutions by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Congress 
renewed its efforts at mutual fund reform. The House passed a beefed up 
version of H.R. 2420 on November 19, 2003 by a vote of 418-2.56 
Among other things, H.R. 2420 contained additional detailed provisions 
regarding the disclosure of mutual fund fees, obligations regarding 
distribution and soft dollar arrangements. 
The following bills were introduced in the Senate in the 108th 
Congress: 
• S.1882, the “Mutual Fund Transparency Act of 2003” 
introduced on November 5, 2003 by Senator Daniel K. 
Akaka (D-HI);57 
• S.1971, the “Mutual Fund Investor Confidence Restoration 
Act,” introduced on November 25, 2003 by Senators Jon 
Corzine (D-NJ) and Christopher Dodd (D-CT);58 
• S.1958, the “Mutual Fund Investors Protection Act,” 
introduced on November 29, 2003 by Senators John Kerry 
(D-MA) and Edward Kennedy (D-MA);59 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Supra note 50. 
 57. S. 1822, 108th Cong., 2003, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c108:S.1822. 
 58. S. 1971, 108th Cong., 2003, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c108:S.1971. 
 59. S. 1958, 108th Cong., 2003, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c108:S.1958.IS. 
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• S.2509, the “Mutual Fund Reform Act of 2004,” introduced 
on February 10, 2004 by Senators Peter Fitzgerald (R-IL), 
Carl Levin (D-MI) and Susan Collins (R-ME).60 
• S.2497, the “Small Investor Protection Act of 2004,” 
introduced on June 3, 2004 by Senator Joe Lieberman (D-
CT).61 
Each of the bills contained provisions to reform mutual fund sales 
practices by eliminating certain types of compensation arrangements, 
including 12b-1 fees, soft dollars, directed brokerage, and revenue 
sharing arrangements.  None of the bills made it out of committee. 
On May 16, 2005 Senator Daniel Akaka (D-HA) introduced 
S.1037, the “Mutual Fund Transparency Act of 2005,” in the 109th 
Congress.62  Among other things, the proposed bill requires broker 
point-of-sale disclosure regarding revenue sharing and differential cash 
compensation.63
D. Recent SEC and NASD Reforms 
A wide range of mutual fund reform initiatives have also been 
undertaken by the NASD and SEC in the past few years, certain of 
which specifically address mutual fund enhanced compensation 
arrangements.  These initiatives have resulted in significant changes in 
the way in which mutual funds, fund directors, and investment advisers 
do business. 
1. Code of Ethics 
On May 26, 2004, the SEC adopted a rule requiring registered 
investment advisers to establish, maintain, and enforce a written code of 
ethics.64  Specifically, Rule 204A-1 requires that the code of ethics 
contain, at a minimum, a standard of business conduct that the adviser 
 
 60. S. 2059, 108th Cong., 2003, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c108:S.2059. 
 61. S. 2497, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c108:S.2497. 
 62. S. 1037, 109th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c109:S.1037.IS. 
 63. Id. 
 64. SEC Investment Adviser Code of Ethics, 17 C.F.R. §§ 270, 275, 279 (IA-2256) 
(2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2256.htm. 
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requires of its “supervised persons” as defined in Section 202(a)(25) of 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.65  The standard must reflect the 
fiduciary obligations of the investment adviser and supervised persons. 
Although it might have gone without saying, the rule also 
specifically requires that supervised persons comply with applicable 
federal securities laws such as the Securities Act of 1933,66 the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,67 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,68 
the Investment Company Act of 1940,69 the Advisers Act,70 Title V of 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,71 and the Bank Secrecy Act.72  
Amendments to SEC Rule 204-2(a) also require SEC-registered 
investment advisers to retain as “required records” code of ethics 
violations and their disposition; records concerning personal securities 
transactions by certain advisory personnel; and evidence in the form of 
an acknowledgement that supervised persons received a copy of the 
code of ethics.73
As part of its adoption of new Rule 204A-1, the SEC also made an 
amendment to Form ADV, the form advisers use to register with the 
SEC.74  The change requires investment advisers to describe their code 
of ethics on Schedule F of their registrations.75  It also requires 
investment advisers to indicate that they will provide a copy to any 
client or prospective client upon request.76
2. Disclosure Requirements 
On August 18, 2004, the SEC finalized new disclosure 
requirements for mutual funds.77  The requirements became effective for 
 
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 80b (2004). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (2005). 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-mm (2005). 
 68. Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2005). 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 80b (2004). 
 71. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
 72. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-14; 5316-32 (2001). 
 73. See generally Investment Advisor Code of Ethics, supra note 64. 
 74. CONNECTICUT BANKING COMMISSION, Investment Advisory Codes of Ethics 
(Feb. 2005) available at http://www.ct.gov/dob/cwp/view.asp?a=2252&dobNAV_GID 
=162&q=299220. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. SEC Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management 
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mutual fund registration filings after February 28, 2005.78  The rules are 
designed to achieve increased information about fund portfolio 
managers, including their identity, incentives, potential conflicts of 
interest, other accounts they manage, compensation structure and 
ownership of securities in accounts they manage.  Among others, the 
following disclosures are required:79
• A mutual fund must identify in its prospectus each 
individual who is a “portfolio manager.” 
• A mutual fund must provide information in its SAI 
regarding other accounts managed by any of its portfolio 
managers, including a description of any material conflicts 
of interest that may arise in connection with simultaneously 
managing the portfolio and other accounts. 
• A mutual fund must disclose in its SAI the structure of, and 
the method used to determine, the compensation of each 
portfolio manager. 
• A mutual fund must disclose each portfolio manager’s 
ownership of securities in the fund.  This disclosure is also 
to be made in the SAI.80 
3. Directed Brokerage 
Also on August 18, 2004, the SEC amended Rule 12b-1 to prohibit 
the practice of directed brokerage, a practice the Commission stated 
“poses significant conflicts of interests and may be harmful to funds and 
fund shareholders.”81  Rule 12b-1(h)(1) prohibits funds from 
compensating a broker-dealer for promoting or selling fund shares by 
directing brokerage transactions to that broker.82  The prohibition 
applies both to directing transactions to selling brokers, and to indirectly 
compensating selling brokers by participation in “step-out” and related 
 
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. 33-8458 (Aug. 27, 2004) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8458.pdf. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2004). 
 82. Id. at § 270.12b-1(h)(1).  The rule prohibits funds from financing distribution 
of fund shares through the direction of any service related to effecting a fund brokerage 
transaction, including performing or arranging for the performance of any function 
related to processing a brokerage transaction.  The prohibition reaches transactions 
executed by government securities dealers and municipal securities dealers. 
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arrangements whereby the selling broker receives a portion of the 
commission.83  “The ban extends to any payment, including any 
commission, mark-up, mark-down, or other fee (or portion of another 
fee) received or to be received from the fund’s portfolio transactions 
effected through any broker or dealer.”84
From the broker-dealer’s perspective, directed brokerage activities 
are subject to NASD Rule 2830(k).85  Effective February 14, 2005, Rule 
2830(k) was amended to prohibit the practice.86  Prior to amendment, 
Rule 2830(k) prohibited NASD members from favoring the sale of 
shares of any investment company on the basis of brokerage 
commissions received or expected to be received from any source, 
including the investment company.87  However, subparagraph (7)(B) of 
the rule allowed an NASD member, subject to the requirements of best 
execution, to sell the shares of, or act as an underwriter for, an 
investment company where that investment company “follows a policy, 
disclosed in its prospectus, of considering sales of shares of the 
investment company as a factor in the selection of broker/dealers to 
execute portfolio transactions . . . .”88
The NASD proposed to strike subparagraph (k)(7)(B) and add a 
new subparagraph, designated (k)(2), which will prohibit NASD 
members from selling the shares of, or acting as underwriter for, any 
investment company: 
[I]f the member knows or has reason to know that such investment 
company, or an investment adviser or principal underwriter of the 
company, has a written or oral agreement or understanding under 
which the company directs or is expected to direct portfolio 
securities transactions (or any commission, markup or other 
remuneration resulting from any such transaction) to a broker or a 
dealer in consideration for the promotion or sale of shares issued by 
the company or any other registered investment company.89
 83. Id. at § 270.12b-1(h)(1)(ii).  The prohibition also extends to circumstances in 
which two funds cooperate to direct brokerage commissions to the selling broker of the 
other fund. See Section 48 under the Investment Company Act (making it unlawful for a 
person to do indirectly what the person could not do directly). 
 84. See 69 Fed. Reg. 33-8458. 
 85. NASD, R. 2830(k). 
 86. See Smith, supra note 50. 
 87. Id. 
 88. NASD, R. 2830(k)(7)(B). 
 89. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed R. Change by 
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The NASD noted in its description of the proposed rule change that 
proposed new subparagraph (k)(2) “would add an objective proscription, 
in that the broker-dealer’s intent to favor or disfavor a particular fund 
would not be relevant to that prohibition.”90  In approving the 
amendment in December of 2004, the SEC noted that “[o]ne important 
purpose of Rule 2830(k) is to help eliminate conflicts of interest in the 
sale of investment company securities, and the proposed rule change 
will improve NASD’s ability to achieve this objective.” 91
The SEC, NASD, and certain states have actively brought 
enforcement proceedings against firms engaged in directed brokerage 
activities.  In 2005, the NASD set records for the number of new 
enforcement actions brought and the amount of fines collected for 
violation of the directed brokerage rules.92  That year, the NASD settled 
twenty-seven cases against retail firms for providing preferential 
treatment to select mutual funds in exchange for brokerage business, in 
violation of its Anti-Reciprocal Rule.  In total, the firms paid nearly $55 
million in fines.93
4. Soft Dollar Practices 
As discussed in Part II.B. below, Section 28(e) of the 1934 Act 
provides a “safe harbor” allowing fund managers to use client funds to 
purchase “brokerage and research services” for their managed accounts 
under certain circumstances.  On July 18, 2006, the SEC published final 
interpretive guidance (“The Release”) regarding the use of “soft 
dollars.”94  The Release clarifies the circumstances under which fund 
managers may use client commissions to pay for brokerage and research 
 
Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Investment Company Portfolio 
Transactions, 69 Fed. Reg. 64609 (proposed Sept. 17, 2004). 
 90. Id. at 64611 n.5. 
 91. Id. at 64611. 
 92. News Release, NASD, NASD: 2005 in Review (Dec. 27, 2005), available at 
http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2005NewsReleases/NASDW_015794. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Section 28(e) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 241 (2006), Exchange Act Release No. 
34-54165, File No. S7-13-06 (July 24, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
R.s/interp/2006/34-54165.pdf.  The Release affirms most of the positions taken by the 
Commission in the proposed release issued in October 2005 (the Proposed Release) and 
is intended to replace Sections II and III of the Commission’s 1986 interpretive release 
(the 1986 Release) but is not intended to replace any other section of the 1986 Release. 
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services under the soft dollars safe harbor and specifically addresses four 
issues: (1) when do “brokerage or research services” fall within the safe 
harbor, (2) what constitutes “eligible research,” (3) what constitutes 
“eligible brokerage services” and (4) what is the appropriate treatment 
for “mixed-use” items.95  The Release sets forth a three-part test to 
determine whether brokerage and research services fall within the safe 
harbor.  They must: (1) acquire “eligible” research products and 
brokerage services, (2) use those products and services lawfully and 
appropriately and (3) make a good-faith determination that the 
commissions they are paying are reasonable in light of the value of the 
products and services they are receiving.96
Significantly, the Release denotes a departure with respect to 
equipment, such as computer hardware, now considered outside the safe 
harbor, even if used in connection with research.97  It also definitively 
excludes “mass-marketed publications” from safe harbor eligibility.98  
Additionally, the SEC has articulated an interpretative standard under 
which products and services not clearly constituting research are eligible 
for the safe harbor if they “reflect the expression of reasoning or 
knowledge relating to” the components of the definition of research in 
Section 28(e)(3).99
IV. CODES OF ETHICS AND OTHER STANDARDS GOVERNING  
SELLERS OF MUTUAL FUNDS 
In addition to being governed by SEC and NASD regulations, many 
financial advisers, whether broker-dealers, financial planners, insurance 
agents, or bank representatives, are members of professional 
organizations and subscribe to a particular code of ethics.  Typically, 
these codes have disclosure and conflict of interest provisions, many of 
which are relevant to the retail sale of mutual funds.  Financial advisers, 
thus, are subject to scrutiny from several quarters.  It is hoped that if 
dubious practices are employed by any type of financial adviser, and 
reported, at least one of the institutions having oversight will recognize 
the inappropriate nature of the practice and take action to stop it.  Given 
the recent mutual fund scandals and number of prosecutions for 
 95. Id. at 21. 
 96. Id. at 26. 
 97. Id. at 6. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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violations of mutual fund rules, the effectiveness of self-policing by 
these institutions has been called into question of late.100
A. Certified Financial Planners 
Certified Financial Planners (“CFPs”) operate under the Code of 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility and Financial Planning Practice 
Standards adopted by Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, 
Inc. (the “CFP Board”).  According to the CFP Board, all persons whom 
it has recognized and certified to use the CFP designation are obligated 
“not only to comply with the mandates and requirements of all 
applicable laws and regulations but also to take responsibility to act in 
an ethical and professionally responsible manner in all professional 
services and activities.”101
The CFP Code of Ethics consists of two parts: Part I consists of the 
Principles and Part II the Rules.102  The Principles are “statements 
expressing in general terms the ethical and professional ideals that CFP 
Board designees are expected to display in their professional 
activities.”103  The seven articulated principles are: (1) Integrity, (2) 
Objectivity, (3) Competence, (4) Fairness, (5) Confidentiality, (6) 
Professionalism, and (7) Diligence.104  The CFP Board describes the 
Principles as “aspirational in character,” but “intended to provide a 
source of guidance” for CFPs, and comments follow each Principle and 
further explain the meaning of the Principle.105  The Principles are 
 
 100. Beginning in 2003, many of the biggest fund companies, including Janus 
Capital Group Inc. and Invesco Funds Group Inc., were charged by regulators with 
allowing some investors to make unorthodox trades that hurt the funds’ long-term 
shareholders.  At the same time, Wall Street firms were charged with withholding 
commission discounts from mutual-fund investors who had been eligible for the 
discounts. See Eleanor Laise, How to Check Up on Your Mutual Fund—New Web Tools 
Help Investors Take Advantage of Flood of Data Now Required by Regulators, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 14, 2005, at D1 (discussing the ability of consumers to monitor mutual fund 
institutions). 
 101. Certified Fin. Planner Bd. of Standards, Code of Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, available at http://www.cfp.net/learn/ethics.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 
2007). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Certified Fin. Planner Bd. of Standards, Code of Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility: Principles, available at http://www.cfp.net/learn/ethicsPrinc.s.asp (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 105. See Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 101. 
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accompanied by rules that “describe the standards of ethical and 
professionally responsible conduct expected of [CFPs] in particular 
situations.”106
For example, Principle 1—“Integrity”—states: “A CFP Board 
designee shall offer and provide professional services with integrity.”107  
The comments to the principle maintain, inter alia, that “[i]ntegrity 
demands honesty and candor which must not be subordinated to 
personal gain and advantage.”108  Coordinating Rule 102 requires that, 
“[i]n the course of professional activities, a CFP Board designee shall 
not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation, or knowingly make a false or misleading statement to 
a client, employer, employee, professional colleague, governmental or 
other regulatory body or official, or any other person or entity.”109
Principle 4—”Fairness”—and the accompanying Rules are 
especially relevant to the retail sale of mutual funds and the potential 
conflicts of interest herein addressed.  It requires that CFPs perform their 
professional services “in a manner that is fair and reasonable to clients, 
principals, partners and employers, and shall disclose conflict(s) of 
interest in providing such services.” 110  The comments state: 
Fairness requires impartiality, intellectual honesty and disclosure of 
conflict(s) of interest.  It involves a subordination of one’s own 
feelings, prejudices and desires so as to achieve a proper balance of 
conflicting interests.  Fairness is treating others in the same fashion 
that you would want to be treated and is an essential trait of any 
professional.111
Rule 402 requires a CFP in a “financial planning engagement [to 
make] timely written disclosure of all material information relative to 
the professional relationship.” 112  Further, “in all circumstances and 
prior to the engagement,” the CFP must disclose in writing conflict(s) of 
 106. Id. 
 107. Supra note 104. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Certified Fin. Planner Bd. of Standards, Code of Ethics and Responsibility: 
Rules, http://www.cfp.net/learn/ethicsR.s.asp (visited last Mar. 23, 2007). 
 110. See Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibility: Principles, supra note 104, 
at 4. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Code of Ethics and Responsibility: Rules, supra note 109, at R. 402. 
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interest and sources of compensation.113  The CFP must also “inform the 
client or prospective client of his/her right to ask at any time for 
information about the compensation of the [CFP].”114
There exists a safe harbor provision for CFPs who provide clients 
or prospective clients with certain written disclosures using SEC Form 
ADV or similar disclosure documents.  The form must include: 
• A statement that in reasonable detail discloses (as 
applicable) conflict(s) of interest and source(s) of, and any 
contingencies or other aspects material to, the CFP Board 
designee’s compensation; 
• A statement describing material agency or employment 
relationships a CFP Board designee (or firm) has with third 
parties and the nature of compensation resulting from such 
relationships; and 
• A statement informing the client or prospective client of 
his/her right to ask at any time for information about the 
compensation of the CFP Board designee.115 
Rule 403 of the CFP Code of Ethics states that “[u]pon request by a 
client or prospective client, the [CFP] in a financial planning 
engagement shall communicate in reasonable detail the requested 
compensation information related to the financial planning engagement, 
including compensation derived from implementation.”116  Rule 404 
mandates that disclosures required under Rule 402 shall be offered at 
least annually for current clients, and provided if requested.117
Principle 6 – “Professionalism” – bears upon the matter of self-
policing.  It states that “[a CFP’s] conduct in all matters shall reflect 
credit upon the profession.”118  Generally, Rule 603 requires the CFP 
who has “non-confidential knowledge” (defined as “no substantial 
doubt”) that another CFP Board designee has committed a violation of 
the CFP Code of Ethics “which raises substantial questions as to the 
designee’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness” to promptly inform the 
CFP Board.119  Rule 604 requires the CFP with non-confidential 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at R. 403. 
 117. Code of Ethics and Responsibility: Rules, supra note 109, at R. 404. 
 118. Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibility: Principles, supra note 104, at 
Princ. 6. 
 119. Code of Ethics and Responsibility: Rules, supra note 109, R. 603. 
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knowledge which raises a substantial question of unprofessional, 
fraudulent or illegal conduct by another CFP or other financial 
professional to “promptly inform the appropriate regulatory and/or 
professional disciplinary body.”120  Rule 605 requires the CFP who has 
reason to suspect illegal conduct within his or her organization to “make 
timely disclosure of the available evidence” to his or her “immediate 
supervisor and/or partners or co-owners.”121  Further, “if the [CFP] is 
convinced that illegal conduct exists within [his own] organization, and 
that appropriate measures are not taken to remedy the situation, the 
[CFP] shall, where appropriate, alert the appropriate regulatory 
authorities . . . in a timely manner.”122
The CFP Code has formal disciplinary procedures in place and 
several possible forms of discipline defined.  The disciplinary 
procedures were designed to ensure a fair and reasonable process.  The 
steps in that process are: 
(1) Receipt of a written request for investigation. 
(2) Investigation of the complaint by CFP Board Staff Counsel. 
(3) Determination of probable cause by CFP Board Staff Counsel. 
(4) Formation of a hearing panel to review all evidence from both 
sides. 
(5) Submission of hearing panel findings to the Board of 
Professional Review, which renders a decision. 
(6) The aggrieved may petition the decision to the Board of 
Appeals.123
The possible forms of discipline are: a private written censure, a 
public letter of admonition, suspension for up to five years, and 
permanent revocation of the CFP designation.124  Notably, the CFP 
Board recently proposed significant changes to its Code of Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility and Financial Planning Practice Standards, 
including: 
• Elimination of the written notice informing clients of their 
right to ask at any time for information about the CFP’s 
sources of compensation, and an annual offer of disclosure 
 120. Id. at R. 604. 
 121. Id. at R. 605. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Certified Fin. Planner Bd. of Standards, Disciplinary Procedures: Disciplinary 
Process and Procedures, available at http://www.cfp.net/learn/procedures.asp  
(last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 124. Id. at Forms of Discipline. 
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of important information about the CFP; 
• Elimination of a current requirement that CFPs report 
infractions of the Code of Ethics by other CFPs; and 
• Creation of a new fiduciary standard for all certificants, but 
allowing use of a lower standard if set forth in the client 
agreement.125 
 The comment period ended September 25, 2006.126
B.  Financial Planning Association 
The Financial Planning Association (FPA) was created by the union 
of the International Association for Financial Planning (IAFP) and the 
Institute of Certified Financial Planners (ICFP).127  The FPA’s 
“individual members include financial planners, accountants, attorneys, 
bankers, charitable giving specialists, insurance agents, stockbrokers, 
money managers, investment consultants, broker-dealer and corporate 
executives, and others.”128  The FPA has nearly 30,000 financial 
planners, allied professionals and organizations that advance the 
financial planning process.129  Members of the FPA are mandated to 
adhere to the FPA Code of Ethics.130  The “FPA’s Ethics Committee is 
charged by its Board of Directors with reviewing alleged violations of 
the FPA Code of Ethics and advising staff on ways to enhance 
awareness by FPA members of their obligations under the Code.”131  
 
 125. See generally Certified Fin. Planner Bd. of Standards, Exposure Draft, 
available at http://www.cfp.net/Downloads/Attachment_A.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 
2007); see generally Certified Fin. Planner Bd. of Standards, Exposure Draft Overview, 
available at  http://www.cfp.net/Downloads/Overview.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).  
For Financial Planning Association member comments regarding the CFP proposed 
changes see Financial Planning Association website at http://www.fpanet.org/member/ 
ethicsresponse.cfm (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). 
 126. Certified Fin. Planner Bd. of Standards, Exposure Draft of Proposed Revisions 
to CFP Board’s Ethical Standards: Comment Period Ends Sept. 25, 2006, CFP Bd. 
News (Sept. 7, 2006) available at http://www.cfp.net/certificants/boardreport_ 
9_2006.asp. 
 127. Fin. Planning Ass’n, FPA Overview, available at http://www.fpanet.org/global/ 
about/overview.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 128. Fin. Planning Ass’n, About FPA, available at http://www.fpanet.org/ 
member/about/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 129. Fin. Planning Ass’n, Institutional Membership, available at http://www.fpanet. 
org/member/membership/corporate/instindex.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 130. Supra note 128. 
 131. See Fin. Planning Ass’n, Code of Ethics, http://www.fpanet.org/member 
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According to the FPA, its guidelines capture the essence of the Certified 
Financial Planners Board of Standards Code, addressed above, but make 
the FPA Code applicable to all FPA members whether or not they are 
also CFPs.132  It employs the same seven principles, but does not include 
the associated rules that the CFP Code puts forth.133
C. Chartered Financial Analyst Institute134
The Chartered Financial Analyst Institute (the “CFA Institute”) 
includes 89,981 individual voting members in 130 countries.135  
Individual members either hold the Chartered Financial Analyst (the 
“CFA”) designation or are active in the investment business.136  All 
members must abide by the CFA Institute’s Code of Ethics and 
Standards of Professional Conduct.137  The latest Code of Ethics and 
Standards of Professional Conduct became effective January 1, 2006.138  
Violations may result in disciplinary sanctions by the CFA Institute:139
All alleged violations of the code and standards are investigated by 
the designated officer (a regular member of CFA Institute appointed 
by the CFA Institute Board of Governors).  Upon completion of an 
investigation, if the designated officer determines a violation of the 
code and standards occurred, the designated officer recommends a 
disciplinary sanction.  The [CFA] member . . . may accept the 
designated officer’s recommendation or proceed to a Hearing 
Panel.140
Potential sanctions include revocation of membership and the right 
 
/about/Princ.s/ethics.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at Princ. 1. 
 134. Formerly known as the Association for Investment Management and Research. 
 135. CFA Institute, About Us, http://www.cfainstitute.org/aboutus/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 136. CFA Inst., About Us: Membership, http://www.cfainstitute.org/aboutus/ 
overview/index.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 137. Id. 
 138. CFA Inst., Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct, 
http://www.cfainstitute.org/centre/ethics/code (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 139. CFA Inst., CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: 
PREAMBLE, http://www.cfainstitute.org/centre/ethics/code/pdf/english_code.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
 140. CFA Inst., Disciplinary Procedures: Procedure, http://cfainstitute.org/aboutus/ 
conduct/complaint/discipline.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
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to use the CFA designation.141
The CFA Institute Code of Ethics requires members to: 
• Act with integrity, competence, diligence, respect, and in an 
ethical manner with the public, clients, prospective clients, 
employers, employees, colleagues in the investment 
profession, and other participants in the global capital 
markets. 142 
• Place the integrity of the investment profession and the 
interests of clients above their own personal interests.143 
• Use reasonable care and exercise independent professional 
judgment when conducting investment analysis, making 
investment recommendations, taking investment actions, 
and engaging in other professional activities.144 
• Practice and encourage others to practice in a professional 
and ethical manner that will reflect credit on themselves and 
the profession.145 
• Promote the integrity of, and uphold the rules governing, 
capital markets.146 
• Maintain and improve their professional competence and 
strive to maintain and improve the competence of other 
investment professionals.147 
There are seven sections of the CFA Institute Standards of 
Professional Conduct: I. Professionalism; II. Integrity of Capital 
Markets; III. Duties to Clients; IV. Duties to Employers; V. Investment 
Analysis, Recommendations, and Action; VI. Conflicts of Interest; and 
VII. Responsibilities as a CFA Institute Member or CFA Candidate.148  
As its name suggests, Section VI is particularly applicable to the retail 
sale of mutual funds and the conflicts of interest addressed in this paper, 
especially subsections A and C: 
 141. Id. 
 142. CFA Inst., CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: 
THE CODE OF ETHICS, available at 
 http://www.cfainstitute.org/centre/ethics/code/pdf/english_code.pdf (last visited Mar. 
23, 2007). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Supra note 142. 
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A.  Disclosure of Conflicts.  Members and Candidates must make 
full and fair disclosure of all matters that could reasonably be 
expected to impair their independence and objectivity or interfere 
with respective duties to their clients, prospective clients, and 
employers.  Members and Candidates must ensure that such 
disclosures are prominent, are delivered in plain language, and 
communicate the relevant information effectively. 149
. . . . 
C.  Referral Fees.  Members and Candidates must disclose to their 
employer, clients, and prospective clients, as appropriate, any 
compensation, consideration, or benefit received from, or paid to, 
others for the recommendation of products or services. 150
D.  American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) are bound by the Code of 
Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants.  Like the CFP Code, the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) Code consists of two sections: (1) the 
Principles; and (2) the Rules.151  The Principles provide the framework 
for the Rules that govern the performance of professional services by 
members.152  “Compliance with the Code of Professional Conduct . . . 
depends primarily on members’ understanding and voluntary actions, 
secondarily on reinforcement by peers and public opinion, and 
ultimately on disciplinary proceedings, when necessary, against 
members who fail to comply with the Rules.”153  The Rule most relevant 
to compensation for mutual fund sales is 503(b) which requires a 
member in public practice who is not prohibited from receiving 
commissions and “who is paid or expects to be paid a commission, [to] 
disclose that fact to any person or entity to whom the member 
recommends or refers a product or service to which the commission 
 
 149. Id. at VI. Conflicts of Interest. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT: COMPOSITION, APPLICABILITY, AND COMPLIANCE (2006), available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/About/code/comp.htm. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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relates.”154  Other similar professional organizations include the Institute 
of Certified Bankers and the National Association of Insurance and 
Financial Advisors (LUTC, FSS, ChFC, and CLU designations). 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 
The SEC, NASD, Congress, and the mutual fund industry are 
investigating ways to provide better and more standardized disclosure of 
mutual fund fees and expenses.  Many experts argue that clearer 
disclosure of fund fees will not only help investors make better-informed 
decisions, but will improve price competitiveness within the industry. 
In early 2004, the NASD formed the Mutual Fund Task Force to 
consider issues relating to distribution arrangements, portfolio 
transaction costs, and soft dollar payments. 155  The Task Force was 
comprised of industry executives representing mutual fund management 
companies and broker-dealers, and representatives of the academic and 
legal communities.156  The Task Force concluded that, 
[m]any of the developments in distribution payments since the 
adoption of Rule 12b-1 have benefited investors by allowing them to 
choose to pay distribution costs up-front, over time, or when fund 
shares are redeemed.  At the same time, the variety and complexity 
of these choices, and the fact that many distribution costs are 
incurred at the fund level, may tend to obscure the extent of these 
costs and the incentives that they may create.157
The Task Force suggested “that the most important changes that the 
[SEC] should consider are those that make the costs and potential 
conflicts associated with mutual fund distribution more visible to the 
retail investor.”158  The Task Force also recommended that visibility be 
increased by the requirement that a short, easy-to-understand document 
be made available to investors at the point of sale.159  Dubbed the 
 154. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT R. 503(b) (2006), available at http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/sec500.htm. 
 155. NASD, REPORT OF THE MUTUAL FUND TASK FORCE: MUTUAL FUND 
DISTRIBUTION 1, available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/R.s_regs/documents/ 
R.s_regs/nasdw_013690.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 2. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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“Profile Plus,”160 it is a two-page document that includes key 
characteristics of the fund and all fees and expenses of the fund, 
including the costs and potential conflicts associated with mutual fund 
distribution.161
Page one contains a statement describing the fund’s principal 
investment strategies and principal investment risks.162  It also includes 
charts detailing the fund’s total return over the past ten years, “and a 
chart that shows average annual return of the fund over the past 1-, 5-, 
and 10-year periods.”163  Page two focuses on “the costs associated with 
fund ownership and possible conflicts of interest.”164  It includes a “Fees 
and Expenses” table that would “show the total fees and expenses paid 
by a shareholder - both transaction fees and fund operating expenses - 
based on the fund’s current prospectus.”165  The costs are to be presented 
both in dollars and as a percentage, based on hypothetical investments of 
$1,000, $50,000 and $100,000.166  In addition, the fund’s total 
“operating expenses is not to be presented as a single number, and not 
broken down into components.”167  The Task Force believes that 
investors are interested mainly in the total amount of fees they pay rather 
than in a detailed breakdown of the various components.168  Page two 
also provides an explanation of “portfolio transaction costs and portfolio 
turnover rates.”169
Another major section on page two is titled “Potential Conflicts of 
Interest.”170  It provides information about revenue sharing and 
differential compensation arrangements through two “yes/no” 
questions.171  The first is, “Does the fund or its affiliates pay XYZ Firm 
extra to promote this Fund over other similar funds?”172  If the answer is 
yes, an investor can click on a hyperlink to additional information about 
 160. Id. 
 161. NASD, supra note 155, at 6. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 7. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. NASD, supra note 155, at 7. 
 168. Id. at 8. It should be noted that shareholders who are interested in a breakdown 
can find it in the prospectus. 
 169. Id. at 9. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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the revenue sharing payments received by the broker/dealer.173  The 
second question is, “Does XYZ Firm pay its personnel more for selling 
this Fund than for selling other similar funds?”174  Again, if the answer 
is yes, the investor can access a hyperlink to additional information 
about the differential compensation arrangements that the broker-dealer 
has with its registered representatives.175
The Task Force also recommended that all broker-dealers be 
required to provide the Profile Plus, dealer disclosure statement, and the 
fund’s prospectus on their web sites.176  It further recommended that a 
registered representative refer the investor to the Profile Plus at the time 
that the representative makes a recommendation to invest in a particular 
fund, stating that the Profile Plus contains important information 
concerning costs and potential conflicts of interest.177  In November 
2004, the Commission proposed an “access equals delivery” approach to 
prospectus delivery, under which investors would be presumed to have 
access to the internet, and issuers and intermediaries could satisfy their 
delivery requirements by posting the required information on their 
websites.178
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It is obvious that something needs to be done to eliminate, or at 
least to reduce, the conflicts of interest that have been created by 
revenue sharing, directed brokerage, differential compensation, and soft 
dollar commissions.  It appears there are two alternatives, either to make 
the practices illegal, as the SEC recently did with directed brokerage, or 
to make those practices more transparent, so that investors are aware of 
the potential for conflicts of interest.  The Profile Plus document 
developed and recommended by the NASD’s Mutual Fund Taskforce 
does a good job of divulging the information that investors need in order 
to uncover and understand the potential conflicts. 
The approval of 12b-1 fees in 1980 made revenue sharing and 
differential compensation possible.  It also led to the formation of 
different classes of mutual fund shares, which allows investors to choose 
 173. NASD, supra note 155, at 9. 
 174. Id. at 10. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 10-11. 
 177. Id. at 11. 
 178. Id. at 13. 
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the way they pay the fees associated with mutual fund investment.  That 
represents an advantage for potential shareholders, which we feel 
overcomes the associated costs, and the conflicts of interest for financial 
advisers.  Certainly those practices need to be disclosed to a greater 
extent, and the Profile Plus does that. 
Both directed brokerage and soft dollar payments involve payments 
to brokerage firms in the form of commissions for executing portfolio 
transactions in exchange for recommending the funds to clients or for 
providing services (most commonly investment research).  These 
payments are thus hidden in the overall transaction costs of the fund, and 
would not be apparent to the vast majority of investors.  On the other 
hand, revenue sharing and differential cash compensation are part of the 
fund’s 12b-1 plan, and are clearly payments made in exchange for 
recommending the fund to investors. 
Each of the four practices involves the potential for conflicts of 
interest, but in directed brokerage and soft dollar payments, the 
payments are made in the form of commissions and it is difficult to 
separate the part of the commission that represents payment for 
recommending the fund from the payment for the execution of trades.  
With revenue sharing and differential compensation, there is no question 
as to what the payments represent.  Thus the potential conflict of interest 
is more transparent. 
Some feel, however, that disclosure is not enough.  In 2004, Senator 
Carl Levin (D-Michigan) stated, 
Even if an investor is clearly told that his or her broker is getting 
paid to promote a mutual fund, the investor is left wondering 
whether the broker’s recommendation is based on the mutual fund’s 
merits or the broker’s financial benefit.  Disclosure does not resolve 
the conflict; it allows revenue sharing payments to continue to 
undermine objective investment advice.  The better course of action 
is to ban revenue sharing from the mutual fund marketplace.179
Our feeling is that if an investor is “left wondering” whether the 
broker’s recommendation is unbiased, he or she should raise the issue 
with the broker.  If the broker’s response is unsatisfactory, the investor 
should find another broker.  If a sufficient number of investors do this, 
 179. Ending Conflicts of Interest at Mutual Funds: The Mutual Fund Reform Act: 
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th 
Cong. (2004) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin), available at http://www.senate.gov/~levin 
/newsroom/release.cfm?id=219868. 
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revenue sharing will be eliminated from the marketplace by making the 
funds and brokers who engage in the practice uncompetitive with those 
that do not. 
Our recommendations are for soft dollar commissions to be 
eliminated, just like directed brokerage.  Those costs are too easily 
hidden from investors.  But revenue sharing and differential 
compensation should be allowed to continue as long as the Profile Plus 
and the associated recommendations of the taskforce are implemented.  
While it is tempting to recommend outlawing those practices as well 
because they do create the potential for conflicts of interest, we feel the 
transparency of those practices makes their cost acceptable, given the 
benefit that different classes of funds provide in allowing investors to 
choose the way that they pay the costs associated with mutual fund 
investment.
